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I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Court of Justice was one of the institutions es-
tablished when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was formed by Belgium, France, Germany, Holland,, Luxembourg, 
and Italy in 1952. 1 The Court was granted comparable authority in 
other areas of the economy with the formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) by the same six countries in 1957.2 Its 
geographical jurisdiction was enlarged in 1972 when Denmark, Ire-
land, and the United Kingdom became members of the European 
Communities.3 
The Court occupies a unique status vis-a-vis the courts of Mem-
ber States. While the Court has the ultimate responsibility for inter-
preting Community law, it does not possess normal appellate court 
jurisdiction over national courts. The integrative efforts of the Court 
and other Community institutions could have been seriously under-
mined by the national courts, given the degree of independence and 
sovereignty which the national courts retained when the Communi-
ties were created. The primary purpose of this article is to analyze 
the interaction between the Court of Justice and national courts 
from the standpoint of its impact upon integration in the Common 
Market. The status and sucess of the Community as an important 
new type of legal order depends upon this interaction being in a 
Community-building direction. In particular, conflicts between na-
tional and Community law must be satisfactorily resolved. A suffi-
cient number of important cases have been decided by national 
courts and the Court of Justice during the last twenty-five years so 
that a preliminary historical assessment of the integrative role of the 
courts can be made. 
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. 
1. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, done April 18, 1951, 
arts. 31-45, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (effective July 25, 1952) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty]. 
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, arts. 
164-188, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. 
3. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom 
of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European 
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, done Jan. 22, 1972, 
in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES 871-79 (1973), reprinted in 2 COMM. 
MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 7011 (effective Jan. 1, 1973) (Norway did not join. The proposed accession 
was defeated by popular referendum.) [hereinafter cited as the Accession Treaty]. 
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II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY 
The European Community occupies a status somewhere be-
tween a loosely knit international organization, such as the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFT A) 4 or the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),5 and a federal system. The relatively 
new term "supranational" has sometimes been applied to Com-
munity institutions and their decisions. Although the power to 
make decisions that are binding on Member States without their 
prior consent is an important characteristic of supranational organi-
zations, this power does not adequately distinguish supranational 
organizations from international organizations.6 Some international 
organizations, clearly lacking the authority of Community institu-
tions, have this power. For example, the Security Council of the 
United Nations can make decisions for the maintenance of peace 
and security that are binding on members of the United Nations.7 
An organization must possess a number of other powers before it 
becomes truly supranational. 
One of the more important of these powers is the power to make 
decisions that are directly binding on natural and legal persons. 8 
These decisions are binding upon persons without any implementa-
tion by municipalJegislative organs. As a further distinction, the 
Community institutions make these decisions as institutions and 
not on a traditional contract basis, as an international organization 
would. 9 This power results largely from the independence of the 
supranational organization from the Member States. This inde-
pendence was partially created in the Council of the EEC through 
the use of majority and qualified majority voting formulae. 10 It is the 
full panoply of power, functions, and jurisdiction given to the Com-
munity that establishes its supranationality. 
Community institutions were endowed with certain suprana-
tional powers so that economic integration would be more easily 
4. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, done Jan. 4, 1960, 370 
U.N.T.S . 3 (effective May 3, 1960). 
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1948), 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). 
6. See Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, in 91 R.EcUEIL DES CouRS 105, 
143-48 (1957). 
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. 
8. Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256, 
261 (1973). 
9. Id. 
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 148. 
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achieved, a step which some hoped would lead to political integra-
tion. There has been some thought that this step might ultimately 
result in a federal system similar to that of the United States and 
Canada. While the Community has successfully achieved much eco-
nomic integration, little progress has been made towards political 
integration. Whether the Community will achieve a high degree of 
political integration, or lapse into a new free trade area with only 
international characteristics, remains uncertain. 
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
The European Court of Justice, skillfully interpreting and de-
veloping Community law through its landmark decisioi:is, may have 
expanded the supranational character of the Community more than 
any of the other institutions.11 In this respect, the Court of Justice 
has performed a role comparable to the early nineteenth century 
expansion of federal powers by the United States Supreme Court. 
Perhaps the fragile status of the Community provided the necessity 
for bold decisions to be made in much the same way as early bold 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court may have been neces-
sary to preserve the federal system. 
The Court of Justice logically occupied the vanguard because 
of certain inherent or developed weaknesses of the other institu-
tions. One might have expected little progress to be made by the 
European Parliament because the Treaties gave it few significant 
powers. It is difficult for the EEC Council to greatly advance the 
development of supranationality because its members represent 
individual states rather than the Community. While the EEC Com-
mission, whose members were supposed to represent the Com-
munity, significantly advanced supranationality in the early years, 
the watchdog activities of Permanent Representatives appointed 
from each state later undercut its role. 
A. Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice derives from three sepa-
rate treaties: the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty, and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) Treaty. Its jurisdiction 
under the ECSC Treaty differs from its jurisdiction under the EEC 
and EURATOM Treaties. 12 Although the ECSC Treaty confers the 
11. Dagtoglou, supra note 8, at 261-62. 
12. Compare ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 37-40 with EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 
170-182 and Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done March 25, 
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greatest supranational powers upon the institutions, it is more bene-
ficial to analyze the EEC Treaty and decisions thereunder because 
of its application to a broader segment of the economy. 
The EEC Treaty vests in the Court of Justice exclusive jurisdic-
tion over cases between Community institutions and Member 
States. The Commission may request a declaratory judgment that 
a Member State has violated its treaty obligation under article 169. 
A Member State may seek annulment of a binding act of any of the 
Community institutions under article 173. A Member State enjoys 
a broad right of appeal since it need not satisfy any particular stand-
ing requirements. For example, the Member State would not have 
to show that the act directly affects it. The Court also has jurisdic-
tion when a Member State seeks a declaratory judgment that an-
other Member State has violated a treaty obligation. 13 The Com-
munity follows the pattern of traditional international organizations 
in permitting states to bring suit before a treaty-created tribunal. 14 
By permitting individuals and enterprises to appeal institution 
decisions, 15 the EEC Treaty makes a significant departure from tra-
ditional international law which has generally permitted only states 
to sue. 16 However, the Treaty severely limits this right by conferring 
standing upon a private party only when the decision is of "direct 
and individual concern" to him. 17 Thus, ordinarily a private party 
cannot challenge a Community regulation by a declaratory action, 
but he can contest the enforcement of the regulation against him 
upon grounds that it is inapplicable to him.18 Private parties were 
probably not accorded greater rights to challenge Community acts 
for fear that such challenges would open a Pandora's Box of litiga-
tion, delaying the implementation of Community programs. A simi-
lar fear underlies the standing requirements in the United States. 
Even though the European Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over such cases, it has refused to relax the standing require-
ments for private parties. 19 Although the standing requirements do 
1957, arts. 136-160, 298 U.N.T.S . 167 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EURA-
TOM Treaty] . 
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169. 
14. See l.C.J . STAT. art. 34, para.1. 
15. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173. 
16. See l.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1. 
17. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173. 
18. Id. art. 184. 
19. Plaumann & Co. v. EEC Comm'n, [1963] E. Comm. Ct. J . Rep. 95, [1961-1966 
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8013. The plaintiff was denied standing to sue 
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not directly affect the degree of supranationality attained, there 
may be less resistance to the building of supranational institutions 
if private parties gain broad rights to challenge any rules promul-
gated. 
Within the traditional relationship between municipal and in-
ternational courts, municipal courts remain free to interpret and 
make international law. In an important departure from traditional 
international law, article 177 requires referral to the Court of Justice 
of any questions concerning the interpretation of the Treaty, or the 
validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions, which are in 
issue in litigation before municipal tribunals. Referral to the Court 
of Justice is proper only when a decision on a Community law ques-
tion is necessary for the municipal court to decide the case.20 Thus, 
the question must arise in an actual dispute before a national court. 
Until then, referral to seek an advisory opinion is not proper. Refer-
ral is mandatory £or municipal courts of last resort and discretionary 
for lower courts. 21 
The type of integration exemplified by the Court under article 
177 may be stronger evidence of the supranational character of the 
Community than the direct power of the institutions.22 Municipal 
courts, with their high degree of independence, must undergo pro-
found adjustments to accept the dictation of critical parts of their 
opinions in cases that the courts have yet to decide. 23 Jurisdiction 
of the Court under article 177 may impinge upon the sovereignty 
and independence of municipal courts to a greater degree than in 
cases in which the Court has exclusive and original jurisdiction, 
such as under article 173. 
Referral jurisdiction is essential to achieve uniformity in the 
interpretation of Community law. Lack of uniformity could well 
lead to Community law being ignored, an occurrence which would 
as the Commission decision addressed to the German government did not concern the plain-
tiff directly and individually within the meaning of article 173, para. 2, Of EEC Treaty, supra 
note 2. However, the Court rejected the argument of the German government that individuals 
should never be permitted to challenge Commission decisions addressed to Member States, 
stating that the letter and grammatical construction of this article justified the broadest 
interpretation. Cf. Alfred Toepfer KG v. EEC Comm'n, [1965) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 405, 
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8031 (challenge by a grain importer 
to a Commission decision directed at German governmental import safeguards allowed). 
20. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177. 
21. Id. art. 177, paras. 2-3. 
22. Opsahl, National Courts and the Community Court under Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty, in FESTSKRIFT TIL FREDE CASTBERG 280, 285 (1963). 
23. Id. 
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undermine the viability of the Community. The solution to the 
problem of the interrelationship between Community law and mu-
nicipal law depends in large measure upon referral jurisdiction.24 
Referral jurisdiction is seriously weakened by the fact that the 
parties themselves are not permitted to invoke jurisdiction of the 
Court. A question can be referred to the Court only by the national 
court. Thus, a national court can easily avoid referral by deciding 
the case on independent municipal law grounds.25 The Court has 
also stated that there is no duty to refer a question which has been 
previously answered by the Court. 28 However, the Court has ruled 
that referral was proper under these .circumstances.27 These weak-
nesses undermine the supranational character of the Court, since 
frequent referrals are essential to afford the Court an opportunity 
to develop Community law. 28 
In addition, the doctrine of acte clair, as developed by the 
French ConseiL. d'etat, could emasculate referral jurisdiction. Ironi-
cally, an advocate general of the Court of Justice first espoused the 
doctrine ~by urging the Court to reject referral jurisdiction in a case.29 
Advocate General Lagrange argued that, where the text of the EEC 
Treaty is perfectly clear, there is no need for interpretation and the 
national court should simply apply the law.30 While the Court of 
Justice did not accept M. Lagrange's conclusion, the French Conseil 
d'etat, in a few cases, adopted the acte clair doctrine as grounds for 
not referring a question to the Court.31 Fortunately, the doctrine has 
24. E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 136, 180 (1967). 
25. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court decided the case on indepen-
dent, municipal grounds in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S . . 449, 455 (1958). 
26. N.V. Internationale Crediet- en Handelsvereniging "Rotterdam" v. Minister van 
Landbouw en Visserij, [1964) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. 
MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8021, at 7360. 
27. Da Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, [1963) E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 31, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8010. 
28. Da Costa involved facts and issues identical to those in N.V. Algemene Transport-
en Expeditie Ondememing van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der belastingen, 
[1963) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 
8008. For this reason the EEC Commission had urged that the referral to the Court of Justice 
be rejected, but the Court did not follow this suggestion and ruled the referral admissible. 
This ruling may imply that the Court believes that it is important to give a decision each 
time a case is referred in order to develop Community law, even though the question itself 
might have become moot in the national court. 
29. [1963) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 45, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8010, at 7240-45. 
30. Id., [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7240-45. 
31. Re Societe Des Petroles Shell-Berre, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 462 (Conseil d'etat, Fr., 
1964) (Conseil d'6tat refused to refer a question to the Court even though it involved interpre-
tation of a complex treaty provision). 
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been infrequently applied by the Conseil d'etat and other national 
courts of last resort in the last few years. 32 
The acte clair doctrine has the potential to destroy the suprana-
tional character of the Court and Community law. Uniform inter-
pretation of the EEC Treaty cannot be achieved if national courts 
of last resort subscribe to the doctrine. National courts will differ 
not only as to the EEC Treaty provisions which they regard as clear, 
but also in the interpretation of such "clear" provisions. Automatic 
referral of all Community law questions33 is probably the only rem-
edy. for this lack of uniformity. 
It might seem that the Court of Justice would be engaging in a 
useless docket-clogging formality by accepting referral of questions 
it had previously answered. However, it might be impossible for the 
Court to change a prior interpretation if answered questions were 
not occasionally resubmitted for reconsideration. In addition, the 
Court may answer the resubmitted question differently because of 
a factual difference that was not regarded as critical by the national 
court. The Court has avoided clogging its docket with resubmitted 
questions by summarily reaffirming an earlier answer if it found no 
reason for a new interpretation.34 
32. The acte clair doctrine has been applied by the French Cour de cassation in State v. 
Cornet, 6 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 351 (Cour de cassation, Fr., 1966). Here, the Cour de cassation 
ref used to stay proceedings and to make ref err al to the Court under article 177, para. 3, upon 
finding that application of the authority of an interpretation of the provision under considera-
tion by the Court of Justice in an analogous case made clear and left no doubt as to that 
provision's meaning. The authority of the previous interpretation thus removed all purpose 
from the obligation to refer. In Lapeyre v. Administration Des Douanes, 6 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 
362 (Cour de cassation, Fr., 1967), the Cour de cassation held that the Cour d'appel correctly 
applied a provision of the Treaty which was clear and therefore not liable to interpretation 
by the Court of Justice. Referral under article 177 was not compulsory for the Cour d'appel 
because its judgments were subject to appeal under internal law. See note 20 supra and 
accompanying text. The Cour de cassation therefore noted that the lower court's decision was 
not appealable on failure to refer alone, as this decision was totally within their discretion. 
Lord Denning, in dicta, indicated the approval of the doctrine of acte clair by the British 
Court of Appeal. H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A., (1974] 2 All E.R. 1226 (C.A.) 
(English court may consider the point is reasonably clear and free from doubt, in which case 
there is no need to interpret the Treaty but only to apply it). The Italian Corte di cassazione, 
in Schiavello v. Nesci, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 198 (Corte cass., Italy, 1972), applied the doctrine 
of acte clair in refusing referral to the Court of Justice, concluding that no doubt was raised 
"on the interpretation (on this point) of the Community regulation, which is expressed in 
perfectly clear wording, which it now remains only to apply in the internal order." Id. at 201. 
33. See Chevallier, Note on the Case Soc: des Petroles Shell-Berre, 3 COMM. MKT. L. R.Ev. 
100, 107 (1965). 
34. Da Costa en Schaake N. V. v. N ederlandse Belastingadministratie, (1963] E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 31, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8010. 
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B. Relationship Between Community Law and National Law 
The position of Community law compared with that of national 
law is an important aspect of the characterization of the Com-
munity. For example, a conclusion that Community law enjoys su-
premacy over national law would attribute constitutional character 
to Community law and suggest a characterization of the Com-
munity as a state. On the other hand, a conclusion that Community 
law is subordinate to national law would attribute mere statutory 
force to Community law. Its enforcement would then depend on the 
national constitutional norms and the Community would be charac-
terized as having international status. 35 
From a legal standpoint, the institutional structure of the Com-
munity raises the question of whether the treaties should be inter-
preted narrowly, as classic international law requires, or treated as 
constitutional documents and given a broader characterization.38 
Community law is neither international law nor constitutional 
law, but rather "a new, third 'legal order' not derivable from, but 
existing autonomously beside, or between, the traditional national 
and international legal orders. "37 This proposition is basic to a clear 
interpretation and understanding of Community law and its rela-
tionship to national law. 
The Court of Justice has declared in several cases that national 
law and Community law are two separate legal systems.38 This sepa-
ration prevents the Court from adjudicating national law issues, 
therefore restricting the Court to adjudication of Community law. 
In Nold KG v. Haute Autorite39 the Court refused to review the 
constitutionality of a decision of the ECSC High Authority under 
the German Basic Law (constitution). In Costa v. ENEL, the Court 
stated that in contrast to other international treaties the Com-
munity treaties created their own legal system.40 In the recent case 
of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- & Vorratss-
telle fur Getreide & Futtermittel, the German Constitutional Court 
agreed with the Court of Justice "that Community law is neither a 
component part of the national legal system nor international law, 
35. P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 153 (1966). 
36. Id. at 101. 
37. Dagtoglou, supra note 8, at 257. 
38. E.g., Nold KG v. Haute Autorit~. (1960) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 857. 
39. Id. 
40. (1964) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8023. 
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but forms an independent system of law flowing from an autono-
mous legal source .... "4• 
In N. V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van 
Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse, the Court of Justice ruled that certain 
articles of the EEC Treaty produce a direct effect on national law 
and create individual rights which national courts should enforce. 42 
Although the EEC Treaty provided that Community regulations 
would be directly applicable in Member States, it is silent as to 
whether or not any Treaty articles are directly applicable.43 Treaty 
draftsmen probably assumed that implementing regulations would 
be needed to carry out treaty objectives in most instances. The 
Court might have reasoned that since the EEC Treaty makes regu-
lations directly applicable, the treaty articles that lay down defini-
tive rules should also apply since the treaty establishes the highest 
ranking norms in the Community. Instead, the Court adopted a line 
of reasoning that · lays a stronger foundation for strengthening the 
supranationality of Community law. 
The Court's ruling was premised largely upon its conclusion 
that the Community constitutes a new legal order, for whose benefit 
the nations had limited their sovereignty, and that both nations and 
individuals were subjects of the new legal order. The Court reached 
this conclusion by expressly recognizing that the functioning of the 
Common Market, which was the main purpose of the EEC Treaty, 
directly affected citizens of the Community. This direct effect im-
plies that the EEC Treaty is more than an ordinary international 
treaty creating only mutual obligations between the nations. The 
conclusion that a new legal order was created was confirmed by the 
establishment of Community institutions with certain sovereign 
rights, referral jurisdiction of the Court, and the collaboration re-
quired of nationals in the functioning of the European Parliament. 
While van Gend & Loos clearly demonstrated that the Court 
had set out to establish the supremacy of Community law, the Court 
avoided discussing the interrelationship between Community law 
and national legal systems, especially the impact of national consti-
tutions on Community law. There was no outright suggestion of the 
primacy of Community law, which would have been a precarious 
position given the paucity of materials supporting such a position 
41. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 540, 549 (Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1974). 
42. [1963) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8008. 
43. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. 
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at that time. The Court left to future cases the determination of 
which articles of the EEC Treaty are directly applicable and which 
require implementation by Member States. 
In subsequent cases, the Court of Justice has ruled that certain 
Community decisions and directives addressed to Member States 
also create rights for individuals which must be given effect by 
national courts." The ECSC and EEC Treaties specifically provide 
that Community decisions are binding upon the designated parties 
and that directives are binding as to the desired aim upon the desig-
nated Member States, leaving the method of implementation to 
each state. 45 The Court took an important integrative and suprana-
tional step in these cases since the Treaties are silent on the direct 
applicability of decisions and directives to individuals who are not 
parties. It would not have been illogical to draw a negative inference 
as to direct applicability from this silence in light of the specific 
EEC Treaty provision on the direct applicability of regulations, but 
the Court refused to do so.46 
Deciding that certain EEC Treaty articles and Community 
directives and decisions are directly applicable is an important step 
in ensuring that Community law is applied uniformly throughout 
the Community. Permitting individuals to assert such Community 
rights before national tribunals is less threatening to national sover-
eignty than the cumbersome procedure of the Commission or a 
Member State instituting proceedings against a Member State for 
failing to implement a Community rule47 with its attendant risk of 
confrontation. Ruling that such provisions could not be directly 
applicable would effectively deny a remedy to individuals. 
C. Conflict Between Community Law and National Law 
The sine qua non of the supranationality of the Court of Justice 
and Community law is the extent of the supremacy of Community 
law over conflicting national law. Community law may be in conflict 
44. Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, [1970) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 825, [1971-1973 
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8107 (a Council decision and implementing 
directive prohibiting Member States from cumulating turnover taxes with specific taxes was 
held to create the right for individuals to invoke these provisions in national courts); S.A.C.E. 
v. Italian Ministry of Finance, [1970) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1213, [1971-1973 Transfer 
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8117 (Council decisions and directives obligating Mem-
ber States to abolish certain administrative changes having effect of custom duties held to 
create individual rights). 
45. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. 
46. See note 44 supra. 
47. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 169-170. 
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with either a prior or subsequent national law or with a national 
constitutional provision. The Court of Justice has been fairly consis-
tent in upholding the binding effect of Community law in the face 
of conflicting national law, but there is no such uniformity among 
national courts. 
A conflict between a Community regulation, 48 or a directly 
applicable treaty article, and a rule of national law of an earlier date 
has not caused any supremacy problems because of the general 
recognition by the courts of Member States of the rule lex posterior 
derogat lege priori (a later statute removes the effect of a prior 
conflicting one).49 Thus, in the event of a conflict with a prior ordi-
nary national law, a national court would apply the Community 
regulation or directly applicable treaty article.50 
The primary supremacy problem arises when there is a conflict 
between a Community regulation or directly applicable treaty arti-
cle and subsequent national legislation. It is not surprising that the 
Court of Justice has held the Community law to be binding in this 
situation, since otherwise the Community could not function effec-
tively.51 
There is no provision in any of the treaties which specifically 
grants Community law supremacy over conflicting national law, 
probably because of the political sensitivity implicit in such an 
overt concession of sovereignty. 52 Hence, the task of solving the 
problem was left by default to the Court of Justice. Without any 
ready-made theory of supremacy, the Court of Justice had to de-
velop the theory on a case-by-case basis in a manner similar to the 
development of new legal concepts in common law jurisdictions. Its 
solutions to supremacy problems and formulations of supremacy 
theories have been influenced by events and forces within the Com-
munity, the foremost of which has been national court decisions on 
the same problem. 
48. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189. 
49. R. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE or COMMUNITY DECISIONS 14-27 (1973). 
50. The transformation theory, inspired by the theory of strict separation of international 
and national law, does not admit of direct applicability, and therefore requires that a treaty 
provision can become applicable as national law only if "transformed" by legislative action. 
Under this view, the Treaty, being ratified by an ordinary law, only acquires the force of an 
ordinary law which being subsequent in time, is now controlling. 
51. See generally Behr, How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts?, 11 
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 3 (1974). 
52. Welsh, European Economic Community Law versus United Kingdom Law: A Doc-
trinal Dilemma, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1032, 1040 (1975). 
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While numerous theories of supremacy have been advanced, 53 
the Court has utilized two diverse approaches in upholding suprem-
acy. The simplest and least provocative approach has been to hold 
a provision of Community law directly applicable without any dis-
cussion of supremacy, which is inherent in the decision. 54 The other 
approach has been to develop a theory of supremacy from the legal 
nature of the Community and its autonomous powers, which the 
Member States created by limiting their own sovereign powers. 
An early example of holding a Community rule directly applic-
able without discussion of a rationale for supremacy is Humblet v. 
" Etat Belge. 55 The Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
ECSC 511 provided for an exemption from any tax on the salaries paid 
to Community officials. The Court of Justice ruled that this provi-
sion prohibited a Member State from indirectly taxing this income 
by considering it in determining the tax rate to be applied to the 
nonexempt earnings of an official's spouse. The Court declared that 
it did not have the power to annul the Belgium tax assessment 
because of the separation of powers between institutions of the 
Community and Member States. However, the Court pointed out 
that a Member State was required, under article 86 of the ECSC 
Treaty, to repeal any act of such state which the Court declares 
violates Community law. The Court reasoned that this obligation 
follows from the ECSC Treaty and Protocol which have the force of 
law in the Member States due to their ratification, which gives them 
precedence over national law. The theory underlying this flat state-
ment is the continental view that ratification itself creates rights. 
The supremacy of Community law could have been sustained in this 
case by applying the rule lex posterior derogat lege priori, since the 
Belgian Income Tax Act of 1948 was enacted prior to the ratification 
of the Treaty, but the Court did not allude to this point. However, 
relying upon the rule would merely have postponed the development 
of a theory of supremacy until a case involving subsequent national 
legislation arose. 
53. The Court of Justice and leading commentators on the legal structure of the EEC 
have cited various reasons for the supremacy of EEC law without labeling any particular 
theory as decisive: (1) new binding legal order; (2) limitation of competence; (3) transfer of 
power; (4) reciprocity; (5) principle of uniformity, safeguarding Community goals; (6) specific 
original nature. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW 136 (1973). 
54. Behr, supra note 51, at 3-4. 
55. [1960) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125. Excerpts from the case are translated in 56 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 540 (1962). 
56. ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1161. 
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Three years later in van Gend & Loos, the Court of Justice ruled 
that certain treaty articles produce a direct effect but chose not to 
rely upon a flat statement of supremacy.57 Instead, the Court cau-
tiously reasoned that the Community constituted a new legal order, 
for whose benefit the members had limited their sovereignty.58 Nev-
ertheless, the Court stopped short of drawing the logical conclusion 
that Community law was supreme, even though the Commission 
had argued this position. 
In Costa v. ENEL the Italian Constitutional Court, in answer-
ing a question referred to it by an Italian Justice of Peace, resolved 
a conflict between certain EEC Treaty articles and a subsequent 
national law nationalizing the electric distribution industry in ac-
cordance with the principle that the subsequent law prevails. 511 The 
Constitutional Court only accorded the EEC Treaty the status of 
ordinary law since it was given effect by ordinary law,80 a result 
reached by application of the transformation theory.81 Thus, the 
Italian Court regarded Community and national law as having 
equal status. 
Costa was also referred to the Court of Justice by the Italian 
Justice of Peace. The Court of Justice ruled that certain EEC 
Treaty articles create individual rights and that Member States are 
prohibited from introducing any new measures contrary to these 
articles. 82 The Court forcefully asserted the supremacy of Com-
m unity law, reasoning that Member States had transferred certain 
powers to the Community and had not merely limited the sovereign 
rights of states as advanced in the van Gend & Loos case. The Court 
drew further support for the supremacy of the EEC Treaty on 
grounds that a Member State cannot give preference to its own 
unilateral and subsequent measures over the new legal order which 
it accepted on the basis of reciprocity.83 Additional reasons included 
57. (1963] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ii 8008. 
58. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
59. 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (Corte cost., Italy, 1964). 
60. Id. at 435. 
61. See note 50 supra. 
62. (1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 596-98, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 8023, at 7392-93. 
63. Id., [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7392-93. 
The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive 
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty make 
it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and 
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 
Id. at 593-94, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7391. 
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the need for uniformity to advance Community aims, and the fact 
that the direct effect conferred upon regulations by article 189 would 
become meaningless if a Member State could deprive it of effective-
ness by subsequent legislation. Thus, the Court has basically re-
jected any effort by a Member State to make a subsequent law 
prevail over the EEC .Treaty. 
The Court may have asserted supremacy so forcefully because 
the Italian Constitutional Court had given national law equal status 
with Community law, which could destroy uniformity of law within 
the Community. In addition, the Italian government argued that 
the Court of Justice should not entertain the question referred by 
the Italian Justice of Peace since no treaty issue was involved in the 
case.84 
In Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 85 the Court of Justice recog-
nized the legitimacy of both Community rules and national law on 
competition in trade. The basis of this recognition was the Court's 
finding that Community rules only apply to restrictive agreements 
which may affect trade between Member States, while national law 
focuses on the internal effect of such agreements. 88 The Court, citing 
the conventional basis of the Community as constituting a new legal 
order, concluded that Community rules must prevail in the event 
of a conflict, thus emphasizing the necessity of uniformity within 
the Community. In the event a national decision on an agreement 
between firms is incompatible with a Commission decision on the 
same situation, the national authorities are required to respect the 
effect of the Commission decision. 87 Such a conflict could occur 
because of a difference between the Commission and national au-
thorities on whether the agreement affected trade between the 
Member States, or on the effect of the agreement upon competition. 
Thus, the Commission could in effect overturn a national decision 
rendered on a specific situation, which is an important suprana-
tional power. If the Court of Justice should expand the interpreta-
tion of "may affect trade between the Member States, " 88 as the 
64. Id. at 438, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7387. 
65. [1969) E . Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) i-1 8056. 
66. Id. at 13, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) , at 7866. 
67. Id. at 14, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7866. "[C]on-
flicts between the rules of the Community and national rules . .. must be resolved by 
applying the principle that Community law takes precedence." Id., [1967-1970 Transfer 
Binder! COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7866. 
68. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85. 
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interpretation of interstate commerce has been expanded in the 
United States, Community competition rules could pre-empt vir-
tually all national cartel law .69 It seems likely that any such trend 
will develop slowly given the precarious status of the Community. 
The most serious threat to the supremacy of Community law 
occurs when it conflicts with a national constitution. In the land-
mark case of Societa Acciaierie San Michele v. High Authority, 70 the 
Italian Constitutional Court declared that the ECSC Treaty provi-
sions, vesting exclusive jurisdiction over treaty questions in the 
Court of Justice, operate totally apart from the sphere of national 
constitutional law and therefore cannot violate the articles of the 
Italian Constitution prescribing that the judicial function be exer-
cised by regularly appointed ordinary judges and prohibiting the 
creation of extraordinary or special judges. 
In a significant departure from its approach in Costa, 71 the 
Italian Constitutional Court accepted the concept developed by the 
Court of Justice in its decision in Costa that the Community and 
national legal systems are separate and distinct.72 Therefore, the 
ECSC Treaty provisions are not subject to the Italian Constitution, 
which is designed to protect the rights of each subject derived from 
his position within the Italian legal system. However, the Italian 
Constitutional Court was unwilling to accept the logical conclusion 
of the separate legal order doctrine that no Community rule was 
subject to constitutional challenge. According to the Italian Court, 
certain inviolable human rights, such as the right to judicial redress, 
would be protected from abuse by the Community. These basic 
rights derive from the Italian Constitution and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. As long as these basic human rights are 
not violated, the Community is free to operate in its own sphere of 
jurisdiction. While this case concedes greater independence to the 
Community, it indicates that a Community bill of rights is neces-
sary for the Community to secure more complete independence. 
69. The Court of Justice has interpreted the phrase to include agreements that are 
capable of "constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of 
trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of. . . a single 
market between States." Establissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs- GmbH. v. 
E.E.C. Comm'n, (1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 249, 341, (1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. 
MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 8046, at 7651. 
70. 6 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 160 (Corte cost., Italy, 1967). 
71. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text. 
72. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. 
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In its 1974 decision of Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, 73 the 
Italian Constitutional Court made another significant departure 
from its rationale in Costa by upholding the constitutionality of the 
Italian law ratifying the EEC Treaty and its article 189 authorizing 
the promulgation of Community-wide regulations. Under the ra-
tionale adopted by the Italian Constitutional Court in Costa, a 
treaty ratified by municipal law would not rise above that status.74 
In Frontini, the Italian Court found a basis for the Italian political 
decision to execute the treaty in article 11 of the Italian Constitution 
whereby Italy "agrees, on condition of reciprocity with other States, 
to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary for an order which is 
to assure peace and justice among the nations. "75 The Italian Court 
reasoned that article 11 would be deprived of normative content if 
a constitutional amendment rather than ordinary law were neces-
sary to implement every limitation on sovereignty. Article 11 was 
intended to permit Italy to join a supranational community. Thus, 
the Court recognized the legitimacy of placing limitations on Italian 
sovereignty in order to facilitate integration of the Community. 
While the Court regarded the Community and Italian legal systems 
as separate autonomous legal orders, it conceded a greater role for 
the Community legal order than it had previously. 
In also declaring a constitutional challenge to a Community 
regulation unfounded, the Italian Constitutional Court clearly rec-
ognized the direct applicability of Community regulations to Italian 
citizens. The Italian Court understood that a state cannot insist on 
implementing Community regulations through state law, which 
might change the provisions or make them subject to certain repug-
nant conditions and, thereby, defeat the goals of uniform applica-
tion of Community regulations. The Italian Constitutional Court 
found it difficult to hypothesize even abstractly that a Community 
regulation could violate the Italian Constitution because the EEC 
Treaty is limited to economic relations and contains precise guaran-
tees. The possibility of a conflict of Community law with fundamen-
tal rights guaranteed by the Italian Constitution was regarded as 
remote because of the judicial protection afforded by the Court of 
Justice. 
It should be emphasized that the Italian Constitutional Court 
has not surrendered its obligation to protect fundamental constitu-
73. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 372 (Corte cost., Italy, 1974). 
74. Costa v. ENEL, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 435 (Corte cass., Italy, 1964). 
75. E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 52. See 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 384. 
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tional rights of Italian citizens from Community encroachment. 
However, the Italian Court has clearly indicated that it will exercise 
great judicial restraint in recognition of the damage that judicial 
interference could cause to Community programs. The net effect of 
the Frontini decision is to concede greater legitimacy to Community 
law and greatly reduce the likelihood of the Italian Constitutional 
Court finding Community law unconstitutional. This decision sig-
nificantly reduces the possibility of the Italian Constitutional Court 
challenging the supremacy of Community regulations. Such a result 
is necessary to the establishment of a new supranational legal order. 
Although the decision does not explicitly recognize the supremacy 
of the EEC Treaty, it obviously makes this assumption, because the 
regulations are based upon Treaty article 189. 
In 1970, the Court of Justice, in Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel, 78 also faced the ultimate question of supremacy in-
volving a conflict with a national constitution. Pursuant to article 
177 of the EEC Treaty, the Frankfurt Administrative Court (Ver-
waltungsgericht, W. Ger.) submitted to the Court of Justice ques-
tions relating to the validity of Community regulations requiring 
exporters to make a security deposit with national authorities and 
providing for forfeiture of the deposit if the agricultural commodi-
ties were not exported within the period of the license. 77 The Frank-
furt Administrative Court thought that the deposit system was con-
trary to certain structural principles of the German Basic Law 
which should be safeguarded in the Community law. Thus, the 
German Court felt that the supranational law should yield to the 
principles of the Basic Law. 78 The deposit system was thought to 
intervene excessively in the freedom of disposition in trade, since 
the purpose of the regulation could be accomplished by other means 
having less onerous consequences. 
The Court of Justice upheld the binding effect of Community 
law in spite of national constitutions on two grounds. The first 
76. (1970] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125, (1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8126. 
77. Id. at 1134-35, (1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7424 
(Council Regulation 120/67, 117 J .O. COMM. EuR. 2269 (1967), on the common organization 
of the markets in the cereals sector and Commission Regulation 473/67, 204 J.O . COMM. EuR. 
16 (1967), on import and export certificates, were the regulations in issue) . 
78. [1970] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 1134-35, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 8126, at 7424 (German Administrative Court claimed the regulations were 
contrary to principles of freedom of action and disposition, economic liberty, and proportion-
ality which follows from articles 2(1) and 14 of the German Basic Law) . 
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ground was the necessity of preventing harm to the unity and effi-
cacy of Community law, which was the same ground emphasized in 
the Walt Wilhelm case79 to sustain supremacy over ordinary law. 
The second ground expanded the concept of the autonomy of Com-
munity law first developed in the van Gend & Loos80 and Costa81 
cases. The Court declared that a claim that Community law impairs 
basic rights laid down in the constitution of a Member State has 
no bearing on the legality of Community law.82 Instead, the proper 
test is whether the challenged Community law violates a similar 
basic right which the Court of Justice must protect.83 The primary 
source of these fundamental rights is the constitutional principles 
common to all Member States. Previous decisions held that written 
Community law constituted a legal order autonomous from that of 
the Member States. The Court of Justice in Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft, expanded this concept by creating fundamental rights, 
which are unwritten but implied in Community law, and then hold-
ing that these implied rights also function autonomously from con-
stitutional rights guaranteed by Member States. The logical, but 
unstated, conclusion derived from this line of reasoning is that there 
is no reason to refuse to uphold the supremacy of Community law 
over national constitutions, because fundamental rights are an inte-
gral part of Community law. 
Cognizant that the treaties lacked a "Bill of Rights," the Court 
commenced the task of creating one on a case-by-case basis. These 
rights derive from constitutional principles common to the Member 
States, just as international tribunals derive general principles of 
law from rules common to municipal law systems. By elevating 
basic national constitutional rights to the status of Community law, 
the Court safeguards these rights at the Community level and 
reserves for itself the ultimate competence in insuring uniform in-
terpretation and validity. 84 The development of basic individual 
79. [1969) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8056. 
80. [1963) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8008. 
81. [1963) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 31, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8010. 
82. [1970) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 1134-35, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 8126, at 7424. 
83. Id., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7424. "[T)he recog-
nition of basic rights is one of the general principles of law which the Court of Justice must 
safeguard." Id., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7424. 
84. Behr, supra note 51, at 6. 
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rights at the Community level will likely instill greater confidence 
in the fairness and protection provided by Community law, and 
thus encourage acquiescence in its supremacy. 
The Court of Justice has not yet established an extensive ca-
talog of fundamental rights, but several rights were established even 
though the Court ruled that they had not been infringed. One of 
these rights is the principle of proportionality, under which citizens 
may have an obligation imposed upon them for a public purpose 
only when it is essential to that purpose.85 The Court promulgated 
this right in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, but found that the 
burden of the deposit and its forfeiture did not violate proportional-
ity because it was not excessive for trade and was a normal conse-
quence of the market system designed to ensure a fair standard of 
living for farmers artd reasonable prices to consumers.86 In a com-
panion case, the Court of Justice declared that freedom of com-
merce was a fundamental right, but found that it, too, was not 
infringed by the deposit system. 87 Clearly the Court has just begun 
its task of developing fundamental Community rights, but this be-
ginning is critical to sustaining the supranationality of the Com-
munity. 
The Frankfurt Administrative Court, which had referred the 
question in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case to the Court 
of Justice, refused to accept the idea that the German Basic Law 
could be overridden by Community law.88 It concluded that there 
was no legal foundation for the supremacy of Community law since 
article 24 of the Basic Law89 only permitted the Federal legislature, 
85. [1970) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 1127-28, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 8126, at 7419. 
86. Id. at 1138-40, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), at 7426. 
87. Einfuhr-und Vorratsselle fur Getreide und Futtermittel v. Kl>ster, Berodt & Co., 
[1970) C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1161, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 
8127, at 7452. 
88. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177, 181 (Verwaltungsgericht, W. Ger., 1972). 
89. Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is as follows: 
(1) The Federation may, by laws, transfer sovereign powers to international institu-
tions. 
(2) For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual 
collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereign 
powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and 
among the nations of the world. 
(3) For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation will accede to 
agreements concerning a general, comprehensive and obligatory system of interna-
tional arbitration. 
In pre-war Germany, "state sovereignty" came to be viewed as unitary, indivisible, and 
inalienable. Therefore, under this prevailing doctrine, it was impossible to transfer any sub-
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by ratification of the treaties, to delegate to the Community legisla-
tive powers assigned to the legislature by the Basic Law. 90 Thus, the 
legislature, by ratification of the treaties, could not disclaim basic 
constitutional rights which were beyond its assigned legislative 
power.91 
The Frankfurt Administrative Court also maintained that its 
position was justified on policy grounds since the supremacy of 
Community law over any national constitutional provision would 
leave a constitutional vacuum, due to the absence of a written Com-
munity constitution.92 There would be no legal check on the increas-
ingly expansive Community legislation.93 A major reason for main-
taining the supremacy of national constitutional safeguards is the 
absence of democratic authorization for the purely executive Com-
munity institutions.94 The German Court quoted a caustic commen-
tator with approval: 
Anyone who tears the rigid norm-structure of constitutional law 
from its hinges with the integration lever of Article 24(1) of the 
Constitution and sacrifices it on the altar of a Eurocratic economic 
union will have to bear the responsibility in the end when United 
Europe has been achieved but the guaranteed form of democratic, 
constitutional decisionmaking has been gambled away. 95 
However, the Frankfurt Court intimated that it might be willing to 
concede the supremacy of Community law if there were adequate 
Community safeguards, including democratic control of the institu-
tions and protection of basic human rights. 96 
Having so expressed its opinion, the Frankfurt Administrative 
Court submitted the case to the German Constitutional Court (Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, W. Ger.) for a ruling on whether the Com-
munity regulations establishing its security deposit were compatible 
with the German Basic Law. Rulings of the German Constitutional 
stantial lawmaking or executive powers inherent in "sovereignty" without impairing this 
concept of an independent and sovereign state. But, following the war, due to the political 
and economic needs of Germany for close participation with international organizations, and 
in view of this doctrine, it was thought necessary to include article 24 as a specific authoriza-
tion. See E. STEIN & P. HAY, supra note 24, at 47-49. 
90. 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 184. 
91. Id. 




96. Id. "[T]he national fundamental principles must be observed so long as there is no 
written constitutional law of the Community." Id. 
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Court have the force of law, but the Frankfurt Administrative Court 
stated that preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice on the com-
patibility of Community regulations and national constitutions are 
not binding on national courts. 97 
The Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court began 
its analysis in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case98 by stat-
ing that it only required a clarification of the relationship between 
secondary Community rules and the fundamental rights of the Ger-
man Basic Law. The German Court declared that there was nothing 
to support a conclusion that primary Community rules (i.e., Treaty) 
could be in conflict with the German Basic Law, thereby diplomati-
cally avoiding this issue. The Court's refusal to express an opinion 
on the relationship between Community law and constitutional pro-
visions outside of the catalog of fundamental rights99 further limited 
the sweep of the opinion. 
The German Constitutional Court accepted the conclusion of 
the Court of Justice that the Community constitutes an indepen-
dent legal system 100 without emphasizing the need for uniformity 
throughout the Community. The German Court characterized the 
Community as an "inter-State" institution to which Germany could 
transfer rights under article 24 of the Basic Law, but interpreted this 
provision in the overall context of the German Constitution so as not 
to permit the alteration of the basic structure of the Constitution 
except by amendment. This basic structure cannot be altered even 
by amendment of the EEC Treaty, even though, below this level, 
article 24 permits competent Community institutions to make valid 
and directly applicable laws which German institutions could not 
make. Article 24 was interpreted rather narrowly as not granting 
authority to transfer sovereign rights, but only allowing the German 
legal system to permit law from another source to have direct effect 
and applicability there .101 
Since the fundamental constitutional rights are an inalienable 
characteristic of the Basic Law, article 24 does not permit these 
rights to be qualified without reservation. As long as the Com-
munity lacks a codified bill of rights and a "democratically legiti-
mated parliament directly elected by general suffrage which pos-
97. Id. at 186. 
98. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 540 (Buundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 1974). 
99. Id. at 548-49. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 550. 
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sesses legislative powers" to which the other Community legislative 
organs are fully responsible, the reservation to article 24 derived by 
the German Constitutional Court must apply .102 The German Court 
recognized that the Court of Justice's decisions had been favorable 
to the protection of fundamental rights but maintained that such 
protection must be of established validity. The German Court inti-
mated that its reservation would be removed if democratic political 
control and legal certainty in the protection of fundamental rights 
were achieved by treaty in the process of further integration of the 
Community. However, it is likely that only an appropriate constitu-
tional amendment to the EEC Treaty can totally remove these re-
servations. 
Thus, in the case of a conflict between Community law and 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution, the 
latter must prevail. In such a conflict, the German Constitutional 
Court can rule on the validity of Community law, but it is limited 
to ruling that the governmental authorities or courts of Germany 
cannot apply Community law insofar as it conflicts with fundamen-
tal constitutional rights. 103 While the Court of Justice considers that 
it has jurisdiction to protect fundamental rights, the German Con-
stitutional Court refuses to allow the Court of Justice to oust it from 
its constitutional mandate to protect the fundamental rights of Ger-
man citizens. 
After asserting its exclusive constitutional jurisdiction to pro-
tect fundamental constitutional rights, the German Court ruled 
that the security deposit did not violate the constitutional propor-
tionality principle or the basic freedom of trade and occupation. 
The decision of the German Constitutional Court in the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case actually poses a less serious 
threat to the implementation of Community law than its constitu-
tional reasoning suggests. In the first place, the German Court can 
find that no fundamental rights were infringed, as it did in this case, 
and also that only certain provisions of the Community law in ques-
tion infringe constitutional rights, which would not always seriously 
damage the effectiveness of Community law. Secondly, the German 
Constitutional Court will only rule on Community law that is en-
forced by "state action" of Germany. It regards as "inadmissible" 
a constitutional action by a German citizen directly against a Com-
munity regulation. Many Community programs are implemented 
102. Id. at 551. 
103. Id. at 552. 
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directly by Community institutions without involving any govern-
mental authorities of Member States. Of course, the Community 
institutions may have to resort to the national courts to enforce their 
program against a recalcitrant party, which would constitute suffi-
cient state action. 
The opinion's careful reasoning keeps the door open for the 
German Court to expand or contract the position taken. The catalog 
of fundamental constitutional rights has yet to be determined. The 
ruling could be expanded to include conflicts between Community 
treaties and fundamental rights of the German Basic Law, but the 
Constitutional Court may be reluctant to do so because the treaties 
were ratified by the German government and the result of such a 
ruling would have a serious impact upon the Community. Refusing 
to so expand the ruling would offer the German Court the opportun-
ity to find that a conflict involved a treaty provision rather than 
merely secondary Community law. 
However, at one point, the German Constitutional Court states 
that "[A]rticle 24 of the Constitution ... nullifies any 
amendment of the Treaty which would destroy the identity of the 
valid constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany by encroach-
ing on the structure~ which go to make it up." 104 This language 
indicates that the German Court may not be confining itself to 
conflicts with secondary Community law. However, it is more likely 
that the language simply means that the structure of the German 
government and Basic Law cannot be altered by a treaty amend-
ment, and that such alteration may only be accomplished by a 
constitutional amendment. The rationale of Societa Acciaierie San 
Michele, 165 that national constitutional requirements are irrelevant 
to Community laws because both have their "respective spheres of 
operation, " 106 is an attractive alternative to the approach of the 
German Constitutional Court in Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft. However, the Societa Acciaierie San Michele approach is 
limited since no action implementing the Community program by 
Italy was required in that case. 
Although the German Constitutional Court presently wants to 
retain the ultimate power to rule on conflicts, this does not necessar-
ily mean that it will exercise this power frequently to the detriment 
of the Community. The civil law tradition of the Community and 
104. Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 
105. 6 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 160 (Corte cost., Italy, 1967) . 
106. Id. at 170. 
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the recognized need for further integration makes this unlikely. The 
strong dissenting opinion in this case may reduce the probability 
that the majority opinion will be followed in subsequent cases before 
the Second Senate, or even the First Senate of the German Consti-
tutional Court. 107 
The Court of Justice in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
case adhered to the principle of absolute supremacy of Community 
law over conflicting national law, including constitutional law. 10x 
The trend is for the Court to base supremacy upon an "implied 
power" concept, by which supremacy is implied by the treaty itself 
and the inherent nature of the Community. The nature of the Com-
munity requires uniform application of Community law. Although 
its procedure of preliminary rulings 109 has given the Court of Justice 
the opportunity to develop the supremacy rule, the final decision in 
individual cases is left to the national courts since the Court of 
Justice has no jurisdiction to decide national cases. 
The strongest resistance to the concept of supremacy of Com-
munity law over national constitutional law arises in the decisions 
of the Italian and German Constitutional Courts. This resistance is 
primarily because the treaties fail to provide expressly for the su-
premacy of Community law and for a guaranteed bill of rights. The 
establishment of fundamental rights at the Community level begun 
by the Court of Justice in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft may 
reduce the incidence of conflict between Community law and the 
Italian and German Constitutions. However, the German Constitu-
tional Court in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft asserted that 
European Court decisions, "favorable though these have been to 
fundamental rights," were insufficient to remove the duty of Ger-
man courts to protect German constitutional rights conflicting with 
107. See 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 558. The European Commission expressed its great 
concern with the German Constitutional Court's decision in a letter to the West German 
Government, alleging that the decision impaired the uniform application of Community law. 
8 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1974 270 (1975). The Commission could have brought suit 
against Germany in the Court of Justice for breach of the Community Treaty. EEC Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. 169. It should be noted that if the Court of Justice had sustained the 
Commission's view, then there would have been an obligation on Germany, as a Member 
State, to make an internal correction in order to comply with its obligation under the Treaty. 
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171. 
108. [1970] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 8126. 
109. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 41; EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177; EURA-
TOM Treaty, supra note 12, art. 150. 
24
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 2 [1977], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss2/2
1978] Integration in Common Market 231 
Community law. 110 Complete supremacy of Community law requires 
a written bill of rights affording Member States the opportunity to 
compare it with their own national guarantees and to know with 
certainty that application of Community law will not sacrifice any 
fundamental rights. 111 Without any such major changes, the Italian 
and German Constitutional Courts will retain ultimate control for 
some time. 112 Belgium, 113 Luxembourg, 114 and the Netherlands 11a 
appear to be willing to accept the supremacy of Community law 
over constitutional law. Most of the national courts have upheld the 
supremacy of Community law over both prior and subsequent na-
tional legislation. 116 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the brief span of a quarter of a century, the decisions of the 
Court of Justice have advanced the supranationality of Community 
law to a surprising degree. The Court has successfully tread the 
narrow path between boldness and caution in order to facilitate the 
acquiescence of national courts. This progress was not accomplished 
by a single sweeping decision but by a variety of Community-
building decisions in different areas. The Court of Justice devised 
and adhered to the doctrine that the treaties created a new legal 
order. Adoption of this doctrine helped to make the Court's rulings 
110. 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 551. 
111. Id. at 554. 
112. The German Constitutional Court in Internationale Handelsgellschaft intimated 
that at some future time Community fundamental rights would be codified and Community 
law supreme. "What is involved is ... a legal difficulty arising exclusively from the Com-
munity's continuing integration process, which is still in flux and which will end with the 
present transitional phase." Id. at 551. 
113. The Belgian Constitution makes no provision as to the supremacy of international 
treaties. However, despite the lack of constitutional provisions, Belgian courts have not 
hesitated to take a rather favorable stand towards Community law. See Behr, supra note 51, 
at 9. 
114. For a discussion of Chambre de Metiers v. Pagain, PAS. LUX XVI 150 (1954), see 
A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 53, at 155 (international treaties take precedence over 
national legislation). 
115. The Netherlands Constitution was revised in 1956 in anticipation of the develop-
ment of Community law. It provides that the constitutionality of a treaty may not be chal-
lenged and that a treaty may pre-empt certain constitutional provisions as well as prior or 
subsequent national laws. STATUUT NEDS., arts. 60(3), 63, 66 (Neth., 1953, amended 1956). 
116. The Court of Appeals of Paris explicitly "recognized that, pursuant to Article 55 of 
the constitution, international treaties, duly ratified, have a force superior to that of laws and 
that, therefore, the EEC Treaty prevails even over subsequent national law." Behr, supra 
note 51, at 16; the Italian Court in an unpublished judgment of December 18, 1973, No. 183, 
recognized the absolute supremacy of Community regulations. See Behr, supra note 51, at 
36. 
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that Community law is binding on Member States and their citizens 
palatable to national courts, thus avoiding the necessity for ruling 
on the primacy of Community law. 
Deciding that certain articles of the EEC Treaty are directly 
applicable was a critical step in ensuring that Community law is 
applied uniformly throughout the Community. Uniformity is essen-
tial to the survival of the Community since the courts of Member 
States would not be inclined to acquiesce in the binding effect of 
Community law if it were not applied uniformly. Permitting indi-
viduals to assert Community law before national courts greatly en-
hances the importance of Community law. 
The Court of Justice has consistently upheld the binding effect 
of Community law in the face of both prior and subsequent conflict-
ing national law. These decisions have primarily relied upon a 
theory of supremacy based upon the legal nature of the Community 
and its autonomous powers developed by the Court. In Costa, the 
Court of Justice built upon its supremacy theory by reasoning that 
Member States had transferred certain powers to the Community, 
thus rejecting the conclusion of the Italian Constitutional Court 
that Community law and national law were of equal status. The 
Italian Constitutional Court later retreated and accorded a higher 
status to Community law in Frontini. 
The Court of Justice has not had any difficulty in upholding the 
binding effect of Community law, even in the face of a conflicting 
national constitutional provision, but the national courts have been 
more jealous of their prerogative as guardians of their own constitu-
tions. In reversing its earlier approach in Costa, the Italian Consti-
tutional Court, in Societa Acciaierie San Michele, finally recognized 
the theory developed by the Court of Justice that the Community 
and national legal orders were separate and distinct. While the Ital-
ian Constitutional Court concluded that the treaty provisions were 
not subject to the Italian Constitution, it indicated that Community 
law was not immune from challenge for violation of certain basic 
constitutional rights. Similarly, the German Constitutional Court, 
in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ruled that secondary Com-
munity rules must not violate the fundamental rights of German 
Basic Law. Although the German Court found that the Community 
regulations in question did not violate the Basic Law, it reserved the 
right to rule on the validity of Community law. The German Court 
was concerned about the absence of a Community bill of rights and 
a democratically elected parliament. 
It is quite clear that the national courts are now very reluctant 
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to declare Community law unconstitutional. However, they may be 
willing to surrender their remaining jurisdiction only when a Com-
munity bill of rights is codified and the European Parliament is 
democratically elected. 117 Although the latter change is presently 
being pursued, m it seems unlikely that this will satisfy the German 
Constitutional Court unless the European Parliament is granted 
greater political power. 1111 The Court of Justice in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft commenced its task of writing a catalog of pro-
117. Members of the European Parliament are presently nominated from national par-
liaments by their own memberships and according to their own procedures. EEC Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. 138. For a discussion of the selection of members, see Kyle, The European 
Parliament, 28 WORLD TODAY 530, 533 (1972). 
118. The procedure of appointing members of the European Parliament from the respec-
tive national parliaments is only temporary, since the EEC Treaty directed Parliament to 
draft a proposal for direct universal suffrage in all Member States. EEC Treaty, supra note 
2, art. 138. At the Community Summit Conference in December, 1975, the heads of govern-
ment agreed that elections should take place in May or June of 1978, with Britain and 
Denmark deciding their own dates. 9 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH 
GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1975 14-15 (1976). See 
European Communities, (1975) EuR. Y.B. 555 (Council of Europe). 
The Council, under strong threat from Parliament to take the matter to the Court of 
Justice, met in Brussels on July 12, 1976, to discuss allocation of seats in the directly elected 
Parliament. The Council decided upon a total of 410 seats, to be allocated as follows: Italy, 
the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, 81 each; the Nether-
lands, 25; Belgium, 24; Denmark, 16; Ireland, 15; and Luxembourg, 6. Stewart, Direct Elec-
tions to the European Parliament, 13 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 283, 299 (1976). Many members 
of the European Parliament strongly favor direct elections in the hope that they will reduce 
the dual mandate problem and ease the administrative inconvenience of varying election 
dates. 
119. The European Parliament possesses such limited powers that its main function is 
deliberation. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 137. The European Parliament is not a full-
fledged parliament, since the European Commission proposes and the EEC Council enacts 
all significant Community law. Kyle, supra note 117, at 533. Rather, European Parliament's 
main functions are limited to advisory and supervisory powers, which in operation are even 
less potent than those delineated in the Treaties. This power is sharply limited as the Euro-
pean Parliament has no power of decision and the EEC Council is free to disregard the 
European Parliament's advice. 
The first success in increasing the power of the European Parliament was a Council 
resolution, J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 94) 23 (1970), annexed to the Budgetary Treaty of 
Luxembourg, done April 22, 1970, J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 94) 19 (1970), granting Parliament 
limited control of the Community budget. See Kapteyn, The European Parliament, the 
Budget and Legislation in the Community, 9 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 386 (1972). The Council 
additionally adopted joint guidelines in which it recognized the right of Parliament to reject 
the budget, 18 0.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 89) 1 (1975), and in 1975, Member States signed the 
Treaty of July 22, 1975, which is subject to ratification, implementing this provision. 
However, any major increase in the European Parliament's powers must be by amend-
ment to the treaties. In 1972, the European Council received the Vedel Report detailing a 
plan for expansion of the European Parliament by elevating the European Parliament to a 
status equal to that of the Council. See Shlaim, The Vedel Report and the Reform of the 
European Parliament, 27 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 159 (1974). 
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tected human rights. It remains to be seen whether the German 
Constitutional Court will be satisfied with anything short of a bill 
of rights treaty. 
The success of the Court of Justice in establishing the suprana-
tionality of Community law justifies its labeling as at least an 
emerging supranational institution, thus giving Community law a 
constitutional flavor. The important steps of satisfying the bill of 
rights and European Parliament objections may have to be taken 
by treaty, steps clearly beyond the control of the Court of Justice. 
These steps are more of theoretical than of practical concern from 
the standpoint of the supremacy of Community law, since conflict 
with a national constitution is rare and can usually be avoided by 
the courts. 
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